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LOCKE ON INDIVIDUATION AND KINDS
JOSEPH STENBERG

Abstract
Locke has been accused of endorsing a theory of kinds that is inconsistent with
his theory of individuation. This purported inconsistency comes to the fore in
Locke’s treatment of cases involving organisms and the masses of matter that
constitute them, for example, the case of a mass constituting an oak tree. In this
essay, I argue that this purported problem, known as ‘The Kinds Problem’, can
be solved. The Kinds Problem depends on the faulty assumption that nominal
essences include only features observable at a time t. Once this assumption is
rejected, new candidates open up for the relevant difference in the world that is
included in the nominal essence of e.g. mass but not oak tree. And I argue that
there is at least one good candidate for the extrinsic feature observable only over
time in which the mass differs from the oak it constitutes, namely its persistence
conditions. The Kinds Problem can be solved.1
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An oak tree grows outside my window. I watch a few leaves fall
off in a gust of wind. Two things seem true after the leaves break
away from the rest of the tree. First, it seems the oak tree lost
quite a host of particles and so the tree is no longer constituted by
the same mass of particles. Second, it seems the oak tree is still
numerically the same oak tree.
Locke tries to preserve both appearances by arguing that one
tree can be constituted by two different masses at two different
times. Thus, although at any given time the mass and the
organism are constituted by the very same particles, the mass and
the organism, in some sense, are not identical.
It seems that we owe William Molyneux special thanks for
As I take him, then, Locke’s view in this regard is similar to the way in which
some try to individuate material objects by their location in space, in that both views
appeal to extrinsic features of a thing to explain the sense in which that thing is
importantly different from other things.
1
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prompting Locke’s attempt at providing an explanation that
reconciles these appearances. The chapter in which that
explanation appears, ‘Of Identity and Diversity’ (E II.xxvii), was
not included in the first edition of the Essay, nor was the topic
covered in any of the drafts of the Essay.2 And Locke writes to
Molyneux that he composed the chapter ‘only at your instance’.3
Since the chapter seems to have been written only at the behest of
Molyneux, and written quickly (from March to August 1693), it is
perhaps unsurprising that this chapter and the way it fits (or
doesn’t fit) with the rest of the Essay provokes the interest and ire
of commentators.4
One thing that is generally agreed upon by commentators is
that whatever Locke takes his explanation of the mass-oak case to
be in this chapter, it depends crucially on the notion of kinds. This
is so because Locke’s basic principles concerning individuation
and related issues depend crucially on the notion of kinds, and the
mass-oak case fundamentally involves individuating (or picking
out as importantly different) the mass and the oak tree. Of
particular importance here is the principle which states that it is
impossible ‘that two things of the same kind should exist in the
same place at the same time’ (E II.xxvii.1); this principle is
known as the Place-Time-Kind Principle. So most interpreters of
Locke agree that the way to make sense of Locke’s treatment of
the mass-oak case is to appeal to some difference in kind between
the mass and the oak tree.
But from this initial agreement proceeds a cacophony of
disagreement over what Locke meant by the term ‘kind’ in the
Place-Time-Kind Principle. There are three main approaches,
none of them without well-documented, and difficult, interpretive

2

For information about the drafts of the Essay, see the introduction to Locke
(1990).
Locke (1976) vol. 4, letter 1655, p. 722, ‘instance’ meaning ‘urging’ or ‘entreaty’.
See OED, ‘instance’ I, 1, a.
3

Molyneux’s letter asking for a chapter on the principium individuationis is dated 2
March 1693 and Locke sent the chapter to Molyneux with a letter on 23 August 1693.
4
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issues.5 Because the approaches and problems with each are
familiar, I will explain each approach only briefly.
The first is the Material-Immaterial Substance reading,
according to which ‘kind’ picks out three and only three different
sorts of substances: material substances (or bodies), immaterial
substances (or minds), and God. Read in this way, the principle
holds e.g. that no two material substances can be in the same
place at the same time, but a material substance and an immaterial
substance could be in the same place at the same time. 6
The second is the Simple-Compounded Substance reading,
according to which, roughly, ‘kind’ refers not only to the
difference between the three sorts of substances outlined above,
but also to the difference between a substance that can endure the
loss of its parts (a compounded substance) and a substance that
cannot endure the loss of its parts (a simple substance).
According to this reading, then, when understood in the relevant
sense, a compounded substance and a simple substance can be in
the same place at the same time, even should the two substances
in question be material. For example, an oak tree is a
compounded substance, in the relevant sense, whereas a mass of
5

For an excellent discussion of these three main approaches as well as the main
problems associated with them, see Jessica Gordon-Roth (2015). In this brief discussion
here, I rely heavily on that paper.
6

The following commentators have defended this reading: Harold Noonan (1978),
William Uzgalis (1990), Antonia LoLordo (2010, 2012), Matthew Stuart (2013),
Martha Brandt Bolton (2014), and Edwin McCann (2014).
If one accepts the Material-Immaterial Substance reading, one problem that must
then be addressed is how it can be that, say, an oak tree and the mass that constitutes it
can be in the same place at the same time. After all, both an oak tree and the mass that
constitutes it seem to be material substances, but they are in the same place at the same
time. Among the solutions offered to this problem are that organisms, like oak trees, are
modes and not substances in their own right (Uzgalis (1990)); that Locke is a relative
identity theorist and so thinks that, strictly speaking, when dealing with organisms, say,
there is one material substance that we catalog in two ways (Noonan (1978) and Stuart
(2013)); and, finally, that Locke is a four-dimensionalist and so treats the mass as a
temporal part of a temporally extended oak tree (Christopher Conn (1999 and 2003)).
None of these views is without further difficulties to address, although considering
them each in turn would take us too far afield. Jessica Gordon-Roth’s Philosophy
Compass paper is a good place to start for those interested in considering these further
difficulties for each interpretive route.
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matter is a simple substance, in the relevant sense. So, if ‘kind’ in
the principle tracks the difference between compounded
substances and simple substances and not just the difference
between material and immaterial substances, an oak and the mass
that constitutes it can be in the same place at the same time. 7
The third is the Nominal Essence reading, according to which,
‘kind’ refers to nominal essences or species.8 If this reading is
correct, then because oak trees and the masses that constitute
them have different nominal essences we can affirm that the oak
and mass constituting it can be in the same place at the same time.
In this essay, it is the most difficult problem with this third and
final reading that I take up: the charge that, on the Nominal
Essence reading, Locke’s views on individuation and kinds are
inconsistent. Anything like a full defense of any of these readings
would take us too far afield—to say nothing of an attempted
refutation of the others. So I will not defend the Nominal Essence
reading in any thoroughgoing fashion. However, in Section 1
below, I briefly motivate that account, since the historical interest
of what follows depends upon taking that account seriously as an
interpretive option. Now, even if one ultimately prefers some
other reading of the historical Locke, it seems to me that more
general and quite interesting philosophical issues are raised in
considering how someone with broadly Lockean sympathies may
respond to this charge.
7

The main defenders of the Simple-Compounded Substance reading have been
Chappell (1990) and Bolton (1994); however, Bolton has recently joined the MaterialImmaterial camp (2014).
A difficult problem for the Simple-Compounded Substance reading is raised by Dan
Kaufman (2007): ‘I…don't think that Bolton’s [Simple-Compounded Substance]
interpretation is right. Locke’s clearest examples of simple substances are atoms, God,
and finite intelligences. I think that these examples indicate that Locke held a quasimereological account of simplicity, i.e., x is simple iff x is without naturally separable
proper parts (i.e., iff x is naturally indivisible into proper parts). Now clearly masses are
not simple in that sense. In fact, masses are compounded things par excellence. In order
for Bolton’s interpretation to work, there must be a sense of ‘simple’ such that masses
are simple but organisms are not. I am just not sure what sense can be made of this’ (p.
506, fn. 21).
8

The two most prominent defenders of this reading are Dan Kaufman (2007) and
Yaffe (2007).
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The problem for this third reading is that Locke’s theory of
kinds, where ‘kinds’ refer to nominal essences, seems to entail
that the mass and the oak tree it constitutes cannot be of different
kinds, even while the Nominal Essence reading of the PlaceTime-Kind Principle seems to entail that the mass and the oak
tree it constitutes must be of different kinds. If this is correct, then
obviously there’s a problem: Locke’s views on individuation and
kinds are inconsistent. This problem is known as, ‘The Kinds
Problem’.9
According to Locke’s general theory of kinds, a kind term, like
‘oak tree’, is introduced by a linguistic community to pick out a
class of phenomena that have some set of shared characteristics
by which the phenomena can be grouped; that set of shared
characteristics associated with the kind term is a nominal
essence.10 It is important to note that, at least with respect to
material things, this way of thinking about kind terms preserves a
role both for linguistic communities and also a role for the
world.11 A linguistic community is, as it were, constrained by the
raw material of the world, in that there is a fixed set of
phenomena from which the community can pick out sets of
shared characteristics. For example, particular oak trees
themselves provide a kind of raw material of features to a
linguistic community and the linguistic community then picks out
which of the features produced by particular oak trees to include
in the nominal essence associated with the kind term, ‘oak tree’.
So it seems that the mass and oak tree cannot be of different
kinds, given Locke’s theory of kinds, because he holds that kinds
9

The Kinds Problem, or something like it, is noted at least in passing by Uzgalis
(1990), Winkler (1991), Bolton (1994), and Kaufman (2007). Kaufman has developed
the problem most forcefully and so my reconstruction of the problem centers on his
formulation.
There are, of course, disputes about how to take Locke’s views on language,
meaning, etc. I will try to present the problem in such a way that it hangs on nothing
controversial. For a brief survey of interpretations and a discussion of Locke’s views on
these matters, see Losonsky (2007).
10

Locke holds nominal essences are the ‘Workmanship of the Understanding’. E
III.iii.14.
11
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depend on the internal structure of individuals in the world for the
raw material included in their nominal essences inasmuch as
internal structures produce the discoverable qualities included in
the nominal essences associated with kind terms.12 So, if an
observable feature is a candidate for inclusion in the nominal
essence of a class of material things, that is ultimately because
those material things all have internal structures that produce that
observable feature, whether the internal structures of those things
are similar or not.13
Now, applied to the case of the mass and oak tree, at any given
time the internal structure of the mass and the oak tree that it
constitutes are not merely similar, they are numerically identical.
So because all the observable features of a thing are ultimately
produced by the internal structure of a thing and the mass and oak
have the very same internal structure, the mass and the oak have
the same set of observable features at any given time. But the
observable features of a thing are the potential ingredients in the
nominal essence of that thing. So it seems that the oak tree and
the mass that constitutes it cannot have different nominal
essences because, at a time, if one of them has a feature, x, then
so too does the other. In other words, there is no feature that the
oak tree has at a time that the mass lacks and vice versa. And
given that a kind-term picks out a nominal essence and given that
the nominal essence of an oak cannot differ from that of the mass
that constitutes it because the mass and oak always have the same
12

E II.xxiii.3, II.xxxi.6, III.iii.15, III.iii.17, and Locke (1824): III, 91.

13

Locke believes that we cannot confidently hold that when things have the same
observable properties they must have the same internal structure. He says at Essay
3.10.20 that human beings assume ‘that Nature works regularly in the Production of
Things, and sets the Boundaries to each of those Species, by giving exactly the same
real internal Constitution to each individual, which we rank under one general name’.
But he thinks ‘any one who observes their different Qualities can hardly doubt, that
many of the Individuals, called by the same name, are, in their internal Constitution, as
different from another, as several of those which are ranked under different specifick
Names’.
Of course, if the feature in question (as is often the case) is a secondary quality, the
way the internal structure interacts with another body (say, normal human bodies) will
also be a relevant causal factor in the sorts of features that might be included in a
nominal essence.
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set of features, the oak and the mass cannot be of different kinds.
There is considerable dispute about how to interpret Locke’s
distinction between the oak tree and its mass, but it has been
claimed that the Kinds Problem is intractable for all of them. 14
This, however, seems to be an overstatement of the scope of the
Problem. For it seems that the Kinds Problem will only arise if
we accept the Nominal Essence reading of Locke’s Place-TimeKind Principle.
Take, for example, one development of the MaterialImmaterial Substance reading: what’s known as the ‘relativeidentity interpretation’. According to this interpretation, the mass
and oak don’t differ in reality, but only in how we think about one
and the same thing in the world. If we take them to differ only in
our minds, then the mass and oak (and not just their internal
structures) are numerically identical out in the world and the mass
and oak differ only inasmuch as we think of each as having
different features. And if they differ only inasmuch as we think of
each as having different features, then we can consistently claim
that the mass and oak have different nominal essences (and so are
of different kinds) and that the features included in those nominal
essences ontologically depend on the internal structure that the
mass and oak share. To see this, for simplicity’s sake, say that
right now the oak-mass outside my window produces three
observable features: x, y, and z. Say that x and y are associated
with the kind, mass, and y and z are associated with the kind, oak.
The two have different nominal essences (because different
observable features are included in the nominal essence of each)
and so the one individual falls under two different kinds. And that
claim is entirely consistent with the claim that x, y, and z
ontologically depend on the internal structure that the mass and
oak share. So given this interpretation of Locke, the Kinds
Problem does not arise.15 And it seems to me that the Kinds
Problem need not arise for defenders of other versions of the
14

Kaufman (2007): 500.

15

For a thorough defence of this view, see Stuart (2013).
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Material-Immaterial Substance interpretation, or for defenders of
the Simple-Compounded Substance reading. However, again,
these views are not without their own serious problems.
Notice that a similar move cannot be made on the Nominal
Essence reading, according to which the mass and oak differ out
in the world, but still manage to be in the same place at the same
time.16 Let’s assume that the mass, M, and the oak constituted by
that mass, O, differ out in the world; that is, let’s assume that,
although M and O share an internal structure at a time, M is not
numerically identical to O. And let’s say, again, that right now the
internal constitution shared by M and O outside my window
produces observable features x, y, and z. Say we try the same
strategy used above: the kind, mass, is associated with features x
and y whereas oak is associated with y and z. Why won’t this
work?
The reason is that M and O would fall under the kind, mass,
and O and M would fall under the kind, oak. This is so because x,
y, and z are all features of both O and M. If O and M have all the
same observable features, then there is no kind that O could fall
under that M would not also fall under. So O and M cannot be of
different kinds. If O and M cannot be of different kinds, then—
given Locke’s principles of individuation—we cannot affirm that
O and M are in the same place at the same time. But we have to
be able to affirm that O and M are in the same place at the same
time, given Locke’s treatment of the mass-oak case. Therefore, if
M and O differ out in the world, Locke’s views on individuation
are inconsistent with his theory of kinds. That is, The Kinds
Problem is a genuine problem.
So, although I don’t think the Kinds Problem is on its face
intractable for every interpretation of Locke’s theory of
indiviuation, it seems intractable for those who accept the
16

This is an important respect in which the Nominal Essence reading is connected
to a different background picture of the mass-oak case than, say, the MaterialImmaterial Substance reading. As it has been defended in the literature, the Nominal
Essence reading is deeply connected to the coincident object reading of the mass-oak
case—see Kaufman (2007). Chappell (1989, 1990) is the principal defender of the
coincident object reading.
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Nominal Essence reading of Locke’s Place-Time-Kind Principle.
However, in this essay, I argue that The Kinds Problem is not, in
fact, intractable, even on the Nominal Essence reading.
More specifically, I argue that a Lockean theory of kinds and a
Lockean theory of individuation, understood in Nominal-Essence
terms, are consistent. I argue that this is so because, given
Locke’s view of nominal essences, extrinsic or relational features
only observable over time can be included in nominal essences.
The Kinds Problem depends on the assumption that nominal
essences include only features observable at a time. This
assumption is false. Given that it is false, new candidates open up
for the relevant difference in the world that is included in the
nominal essence of mass, but not oak tree. And there is at least
one good candidate for the extrinsic or relational feature
observable only over time in which the mass differs from the oak
it constitutes, namely, its persistence conditions. And so I argue
that Locke at least could, and perhaps did, include the persistence
conditions of things like masses and oak trees in the nominal
essences, mass and oak tree. The mass and the oak constituted by
that mass outside my window really do differ and this difference
is included in the nominal essences of both. Thus the mass and
oak differ in kind and so can be in the same place at the same
time, even though at a time they share the very same internal
structure.17
The remainder of this paper is broken down into three sections.
In the first, I very briefly motivate the Nominal Essence reading
of the Place-Kind-Time Principle. In the second section, I set out
the Kinds Problem more carefully. In the final section, I lay out
the solution to the Kinds Problem.
§1. Motivating the Nominal Essence Reading
The goal of this brief section is not to convince anyone that we
ought to read ‘kind’ in the Place-Time-Kind Principle as a
Again, as I take him, then, Locke’s view in this regard is similar to the way in
which some try to individuate material objects by their location in space, in that both
views appeal to extrinsic features of a thing to explain the sense in which that thing is
importantly different from other things.
17
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reference to nominal essences. Rather, I aim to motivate readers
to take this reading seriously as a possible account of what Locke
himself was up to. The project of determining, all things
considered, the best reading of this principle is certainly
worthwhile and it is a wider debate to which I hope to contribute
by showing that a purported problem with one reading isn’t in
fact a problem.18 However, anything approaching a full defense
of this reading would take us too far afield.
The positive case in favor of the Nominal Essence Reading is
best developed as a kind of cumulative textual case.19 The first
part of that case involves drawing attention to passages in E
II.xxvii itself in which Locke clearly draws our attention to the
importance of nominal essences in individuating things that are
often found together. For example, Locke says:
’Tis not therefore Unity of Substance that comprehends all sorts of Identity,
or will determine it in every Case: But to conceive, and judge of it aright,
we must consider what Idea the Word it is applied to stands for: It being
one thing to be the same Substance, another the same Man, and a third the
same Person, if Person, Man, and Substances, are three Names standing
for three different Ideas; for such as is the Idea belonging to the Name,
such must be the Identity (E II.xxvii.7)

In this passage, ‘idea’ clearly refers to a nominal essence. And
an implication of the passage seems to be that there is no serious
problem with something’s being simultaneously a substance, a
man, and a person because these are three different kinds of
things. But if that is so, then it is plausible to think that ‘kind’ in
the Place-Kind-Time Principle refers to nominal essences, since
the kinds referred to in this passage are clearly nominal essences.
Mutatis mutandi, the same can be said of Locke’s account of the
mass-oak case itself. And so II.xxvii provides good reason for
thinking that we should read ‘kind’ in the Place-Time-Kind
18

For those interested in this wider debate, see Gordon-Roth (2015).

19

What follows in this section is a rehearsal of the case put forward by Dan
Kaufman (2007). I take it that he is the most forceful defender of this view. Another
less forceful defender of the view is Gideon Yaffe. See Yaffe (2007).
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Principle as referring to nominal essences.
But evidence in favor of this reading can also be drawn from
material elsewhere in the Essay. It has been convincingly argued
that Locke’s theory of kinds in the Essay is a theory of nominal
essences—the next section of the paper rehearses some of that
argument.20 It seems plausible to think that that theory should be
read into the Place-Kind-Time Principle, since it is Locke’s
considered view about kinds and, as we have seen, reading ‘kind’
in that way makes good sense of some of the examples that Locke
explicitly uses later in II.xxvii.
Of course much more can be and has been said in defence of
the Nominal Essence Reading of Locke.21 But I hope this very
brief overview is enough to make it clear that the Nominal
Essence Reading is a live interpretive option. Moving forward,
then, I take it for granted that, as a historical project, a solution to
the Kinds Problem is worth seeking.
§2: The Kinds Problem
The Kinds Problem holds that Locke is committed to the claim
that (1) the mass and oak tree it constitutes are of different kinds
and to the claim that (2) the mass and the oak tree it constitutes
cannot be of different kinds. The former claim is secured by the
Nominal Essence reading of Locke’s Place-Time-Kind Principle.
The latter claim is secured by way of an analysis of Locke’s
theory of kinds. Since I am assuming that the Nominal Essence
reading is correct, in what follows I will do more to motivate and
carefully set out the Kinds Problem by focusing on why Locke
seems to be committed to the second of these claims.22
There are two key principles that Locke apparently accepts that
make it seem undeniable that the mass and the oak tree it
constitutes cannot be of different kinds. First, nominal essences
specify the content of kind terms. Second, nominal essences
20

Kaufman (2007).

21

I point the interested reader to Kaufman (2007) for a fuller defense of this
reading.
22

In this section of the paper, I will be relying heavily on Kaufman (2007).
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associated with material objects are formed by abstracting
features that depend on the internal structures of those objects. I
will note some of the most important evidence that strongly
suggests Locke is committed to these claims.
Locke’s first presentation of the distinction between real and
nominal essences helps make it clear that nominal essences
specify the content of kind terms. In introducing the notion of a
nominal essence he says:
Things are ranked under Names into sorts or Species, only as they agree to
certain abstract Ideas, to which we have annexed those names, the Essence
of each Genus, or Sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract Idea, which
the General, or Sortal…Name stands for. (E III.iii.15)

So, a nominal essence (‘Essence’ in the passage quoted) just is
the general idea that a general name stands for. General ideas are
those that by ‘way of abstraction…are made capable of
representing more Individuals than one’ (E III.iii.6). Kind terms
are the paradigm case of general ideas. And so general names,
like ‘oak tree’ and ‘mass’, stand for nominal essences.
Now to the claim that Locke accepts the second principle:
nominal essences associated with material objects are formed by
abstracting features that depend on the internal structures of those
objects. Locke affirms that there is a ‘real internal, but generally
in Substances, unknown Constitution of Things, whereon their
discoverable Qualities depend’ (E III.iii.15). This real internal
constitution may be called the ‘essence’ of a thing and we use the
term ‘essence’ in this sense ‘when we speak of the Essence of
particular things, without giving them any Name’ (III.iii.15). In
other words, prior to our naming things, particular things have
discoverable features that ontologically depend on the internal
structure of those particular things. It seems that by ‘internal
structure’ Locke has in mind the corpuscularianism of his day,
which holds that the microphysical structures of things—the
‘insensible Parts’ (III.iii.17)—ultimately explain all the
observable features that things have. At the very least, it seems
clear that Locke wants his view on these matters to be consistent
98

with corpuscularianism, since it was the best theory available at
the time. So, according to Locke, the observable features of
material objects depend on the internal structures of those objects.
This gets us half way to the second principle.
The second half of the principle suggests that nominal essences
associated with material objects are formed by abstracting a set of
shared features from a set of material objects. In other words, it
suggests that we form general ideas concerning material objects
by noticing natural or objective similarities between particular
material objects. And then, leaving out dissimilarities and
similarities we think are irrelevant, we fuse together a set of
simple ideas into a general kind idea that captures what is, by our
lights, importantly shared by that set of things.23 This movement
from the whole set of objective similarities to a subset of
importantly shared objective similarities is the process of
abstracting. And, on Locke’s view, it is by way of this process
that we form general ideas.
That this is Locke’s view seems clear.24 He says, ‘[W]e come
to have the Ideas of particular sorts of Substances, by collecting
such Combinations of simple Ideas, as are by Experience and
Observation of Men’s Senses taken notice of to exist together,
and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal
Constitution, or unknown Essence of that Substance’ (E
II.xxiii.3). So, for example, ‘’Tis the ordinary Qualities,
observable in Iron, or a Diamond, put together, that make the true
complex Idea of those Substances’ (II.xxiii.3 again). And in
another telling statement he says:
I would not here be thought to forget, much less to deny, that Nature in the
Production of Things, makes several of them [particulars] alike: there is
nothing more obvious, especially in the Races of Animals, and all Things
propagated by Seed. But yet, I think, we may say, the sorting of them
under Names, is the Workmanship of the Understanding, taking occasion
from the similitude it observes amongst them, to make abstract general
23

For example, the kind, gold, includes the simple ideas Yellowness, dissolvability
in aqua regia, etc. (Essay II.xxiii.10).
24

See E II.xxiii.3; II.xxiii.11; III.iii.12; III.iii.17; and Conn (2002): 480.
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Ideas, and set them up in the mind, with Names annexed to them, as
Patterns, or Forms. (E III.iii.13)

Taken together, these two passages strongly suggest that Locke
accepts the picture the second principle ascribes to him.25 There
are objective similarities between things in nature because the
internal structures of things generate similar observable features.
Humans bring to the world the ability to sort things on the basis
of similarities and differences. When confronted with what seem
to be importantly similar things, humans form nominal essences
that include the set of important, shared features. And they
introduce names to associate with those nominal essences.
So it seems that Locke accepts both of these principles: (1)
nominal essences specify the content of kind terms and (2)
nominal essences associated with material objects are formed by
abstracting features that depend on the internal structures of those
objects. But if he does, then it seems Locke is forced to say that
the mass and oak tree cannot differ in kind. For at any given time,
the mass, M, and oak, O, produce the very same set of observable
features because (by principle 2) observable features are
generated by internal structures and the mass and oak share a
numerically identical internal structure; after all, the mass
constitutes the oak tree. But observable features are the
ingredients in nominal essences (by principle 2). So it seems that
whatever nominal essence applies to M must apply to O and vice
versa; in other words, the mass, M, and oak tree, O, cannot differ
with respect to the nominal essences that apply to them. And thus
they cannot differ with respect to their kinds (by principle 1). But,
according to the Place-Time-Kind Principle, they must be of
different kinds, since they are in the same place at the same time.
So it seems Locke is saddled with The Kinds Problem. He
cannot save the dual appearances with which I started the paper;
it can’t be the case that the oak tree is constituted by a different
mass, but remains numerically the same oak tree. For he cannot
appeal to a difference in kind to make sense of how the oak tree
25

There are, of course, other passages that support this reading. See, for example, E
II.xxiii.11, III.iii.12, and III.iii.17.
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can exist in the same place at the same time as the mass and then
endure through some change that the mass can’t. So, unless there
is some solution to the Kinds Problem, on the Nominal Essence
reading, Locke offers us no coherent way of making sense of
appearances in cases like that of the mass and oak, which he
obviously aims to do; his views on individuation and kinds are
inconsistent.
§3: The Solution to the Kinds Problem
In this section, I intend to show that, even on the Nominal
Essence reading of the Place-Time-Kind Principle, Locke’s
theory of kinds and his theory of individuation are not in principle
inconsistent and, further, to give reason to believe that Locke
himself did not hold inconsistent views on this matter. And so I
intend to show that he could, or perhaps did, consistently hold
that (1) a mass at any given time has precisely the same internal
structure as the oak tree the mass constitutes at that time and that
(2) the mass is not of the same kind as the oak tree at any given
time.
The crux of the solution is the claim that the Kinds Problem
doesn’t take into account the sorts of features that Locke includes
in nominal essences. So the Kinds Problem only arises because it
unnecessarily restricts the sorts of features included in nominal
essences to those observable at a time. Ultimately, I will argue
that it is open to Locke to include different features observable
only over time into the nominal essences of mass and oak tree,
namely, the persistence conditions of each.26 If I can show that
this is possible on Locke’s account, even within the strictures set
out above concerning the causal role of internal structures in
generating the ingredients of nominal essences, then I will have
26

I am not the first commentator to argue that persistence conditions are (at least
often) included in nominal essences. For example, Matthew Stuart says, it ‘does seem to
be [Locke’s] view that the persistence conditions that govern things of a kind are built
into the nominal essence that defines the kind’ (2013: 333). However, no commentator
of whom I am aware has further argued that the fact that persistence conditions can be
included in the nominal essences of things can play an important part in a solution to
the Kinds Problem. And that seems an important and, as of yet, unappreciated result.
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shown that masses and oak trees can be of different kinds. They
can be of different kinds because Locke clearly thought that
masses and oaks have different persistence conditions and a
difference in kind can be maintained so long as there is some
difference in the nominal essences associated with masses and
oak trees.
To put it more clearly, there is some feature p that the mass,
M, outside my window has that the oak, O, constituted by M
lacks, namely, its persistence conditions. And so M and O do not
have all the same features. The features in which they differ, their
respective persistence conditions, are included in the nominal
essences of mass and oak tree, and so M falls under the kind,
mass, and not oak whereas O falls under oak and not mass. And
so, given Locke’s principle that things of different kinds can be in
the same place at the same time, in the case of the mass and the
oak tree constituted by it, it can be true that the oak tree
constituted by mass M1 at time t1 is the very same oak tree as the
one constituted by mass M2 at time t2, where M1 is not identical to
M2.27 In other words, I can save the appearances with which I
began the essay from within a Lockean framework and thereby
solve the Kinds Problem.
There are two things to notice about Locke’s theory of nominal
essences that make it seem at least possible that the persistence
conditions of a thing could be included in its nominal essence.
The first thing to notice is that Locke does not hold that all
features of a nominal essence are non-relational, or intrinsic,
features of the entity or entities picked out by the word that stands
for that nominal essence.28 A straightforward example that Locke
‘For we never finding, nor conceiving it possible, that two things of the same kind
should exist in the same place at the same time, we rightly conclude, that whatever
exists any where at any time, excludes all of the same kind, and is there it self alone’ (E
II.xxvii.1).
27

28

The non-relational/relational distinction (or the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction) is
famously resistant to analysis. But it seems that I have some of my properties purely in
virtue of the way I am—e.g. my mass; these are non-relational properties. And I have
other properties in virtue of the way I interact with the world—e.g. my weight; these are
relational properties.
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provides of a purely relational, or extrinsic, feature being
included in a nominal essence is the case of the sun; Locke says
that the sun’s being ‘at a certain distance from us’ is part of its
nominal essence (E II.xxiii.6).29 Obviously, the sun’s being a
certain distance from us involves a certain relation between the
sun and us, and so clearly purely relational features of this kind
can be included in nominal essences.
Indeed, Locke very frequently includes relational features in
nominal essences. Consider the case of powers. Locke claims that
‘Powers make a great part of our complex Ideas of Substances’,
and for Locke, ‘Power includes in it some kind of relation’,
namely, at least in ordinary cases, a relation between something
with an active power (a power to do something) and something
with a passive power (a power to undergo something) (E
II.xxiii.8, II.ii.3). In other words, Locke accepts that the nominal
Locke spends a chapter of the Essay (2.25) on relations and what he says is helpful.
At a very basic level he says that non-relational features are those that involve
considering things ‘as they are in themselves’ (Essay 2.25.1) or as ‘something absolute
in the Subject’ (Essay 2.25.3). On the other hand, ‘[t]he nature…of Relation, consists in
the referring, or comparing two things, one to another’ (Essay 2.25.5). (For those
interested in the modern discussion, see Weatherson and Marshall (2014).)
Although Locke does not use the term ‘nominal essence’ in this passage, it seems
clear that that is what he has in mind. For at the beginning of the section, without using
the terms, Locke makes use of the distinction between a real essence and a nominal
essence, saying, ‘all the Ideas we have of particular distinct sorts of Substances, are
nothing but several Combinations of simple Ideas, co-existing in such, though
unknown, Cause of their Union, as makes the whole subsist of itself’ (Essay 2.23.6).
The real essence is the ‘unknown Cause’ in question and ‘the Ideas’ in question are
nominal essences. It seems especially difficult to deny that the relevant Ideas mentioned
in that section are nominal essences when one compares that passage to others in the
Essay—e.g. at Essay 3.6.6, where Locke says that he calls the ‘abstract Ideas of
[Substances]…their nominal Essence’. What is more, it isn’t as though the sun is
treated as an importantly different case in this context. It appears on a list of what
clearly seem to be standard examples of nominal essences: ‘Man, Horse, Sun, Water,
Iron’ (Essay 2.23.6). So it seems that, indeed, Locke includes the sun’s being ‘at a
certain distance from us’ in the nominal essence Sun. Admittedly, the nominal essence
Sun is a bit of an odd case, since it includes this sort of purely relational feature and not
just qualities or powers. But for present purposes, what matters is not how often purely
relational features are included in nominal essences, but only that Locke doesn’t
categorically exclude purely relational features from nominal essences. And this single
example is enough to demonstrate that he doesn’t categorically exclude purely
relational features from nominal essences.
29
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essences of substances frequently include relational features of
those substances. For example, part of the nominal essence of
Fire is the power ‘which it has to change the colour and
consistency of Wood’ (E II.xxiii.7).
Of course, it is not at all surprising that relational features of
entities can be included in the nominal essences of things given
Locke’s theory of secondary qualities, according to which: ‘The
sensible secondary Qualities, which depending on these, are
nothing but the Powers, those Substances have to produce several
Ideas in us by our Senses; which Ideas are not in the things
themselves, otherwise than as any thing is in its Cause’ (E
II.xxiii.9). So although the internal structure in virtue of which
things have their sensible qualities are non-relational features of
those entities, whenever a color, sound, smell, et cetera is
included in a nominal essence, a relational feature of the thing has
been included in its nominal essence. As a final example,
consider the nominal essence of Swan and the slew of secondary
qualities and powers included therein: ‘white Colour, long Neck,
red Beak, black Legs, and whole Feet, and all these of a certain
size, with a power of swimming in the Water, and making a
certain kind of Noise’ (E II.xxiii.14). So it should be clear that
Locke thinks that relational features of things are frequently
included in their nominal essences.
However, it seems that this feature of Locke’s discussion alone
won’t get one very far in dealing with the cases in which I’m
interested, namely, cases like the case of the mass and the oak
tree it constitutes. For it still isn’t entirely clear how in cases like
that there could be a divergence in the relational properties of the
mass and the oak tree. This takes us to the second thing to notice
about Locke’s theory of nominal essences: among the relational
features that can be considered relevant to a thing’s nominal
essence are relational features that are not observable at a single
moment in time. That is, some of these features can only be
discovered through observation over an extended period of time
and yet they are still included in nominal essences.
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Consider the example of gold.30 Locke says that part of the
nominal essence of gold is ‘its Solubility in Aqua Regia’ (Essay
III.vi.6).31 Clearly gold’s passive power to dissolve in aqua regia
(a mixture of nitric and hydrochloric acids) requires an extended
period of time in order to occur and thus it requires an extended
period of time to observe. So in the case of gold a relational
feature of it that requires a period of time to be observed is
included in its nominal essence.32
Now, with this in mind, consider the claim that, given Locke’s
view of kinds, there is no way for the mass and the oak tree it
constitutes at a time to be of different kinds, if the mass, M, and
oak, O, are thought to differ out in the world: the argument is that,
because O and M, which constitutes it at a time, have numerically
identical internal constitutions, M and O cannot differ with
respect to their observable features. And because observable
features are the ingredients in nominal essences, the nominal
essences that apply to O and M cannot differ because if O falls
under a nominal essence so too will M and vice versa. If that is
so, then the mass and the oak tree cannot be of different kinds.
The preceding discussion opens up room to object to this line
30

There are other examples, of course. Here are two: loadstones and opium.
According to Locke, ‘Hardness, Friability, and Power to draw Iron, we say, are
Qualities to be found in a Loadstone’ (E II.xxiii.3). Of course, the power to draw iron is
a relational property. And it also is the sort of property that requires a duration in order
to be observed; that is, we cannot observe iron being drawn towards a loadstone at an
instant. So here too we have a case in which a relational feature that is not observable at
an instant is included in a nominal essence.
Consider also the case of opium. Locke says that ‘the Colour and Taste of Opium,
are, as well as its soporifick or anodyne Virtues, meer Powers depending on its primary
Qualities’ (E II.xxiii.8). It seems clear that opium’s soporific power is also a relational
feature of opium that can only be observed over a period of time, and yet it is included
in the nominal essence of opium. So, for Locke nothing in principle keeps some
relational feature of a thing that is observable only over a temporal interval from being
a part of the nominal essence of that thing.
31

See also, E II.xxiii.37.

The point here is not that the disposition underlying gold’s passive power to
dissolve in aqua regia is itself extended in time. But rather the point is that some
features (such as dispositions) that are included in nominal essences can only be
observed and discovered over some stretch of time.
32
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of reasoning. From the fact that the oak tree and the mass
constituting it have numerically identical internal constitutions at
a time it does not follow that they must be alike with respect to
the sorts of observable features relevant to nominal essences. For
the observable features relevant to nominal essences may only be
recognizable over time, rather than at an instant. We saw that it
was actually the case that Locke included features only
observable over time in his descriptions of the nominal essence of
gold, and so we know that it is consistent with Locke’s view to
include such a feature. But is there any good candidate for a
feature recognizable only over time that might be included in the
nominal essences of the oak tree and/or the mass constituting it so
as to place them in distinct kinds?
I believe that there is, namely, the respective persistence
conditions of masses and oak trees.33 There is no need to bar
persistence conditions from inclusion on the grounds that they
are, on Locke’s account, relational in character.34 For we have
seen that relational features are included in nominal essences.
But not only are the relevant persistence conditions not barred
from inclusion, they also seem to be a good candidate. Note that
Locke is very clear that the persistence conditions of the mass and
the oak tree differ. At II.xxvii.3, he says, ‘whilst [Atoms] exist
united together, the Mass, consisting of the same Atoms, must be
the same Mass, or the same Body, let the parts be never so
differently jumbled: But if one of these Atoms be taken away, or
one new one added, it is no longer the same Mass, or the same
Body’. So a mass persists so long as all the atoms that make it up
remain united and no new atoms are added to it. But a plant, like
an oak tree, ‘continues to be the same Plant, as long as it partakes
of the same Life, though that Life be communicated to new
Particles of Matter’ (II.xxvii.4). So an oak will persist so long as
it shares in a single vegetative life, whether particles are added or
33

In footnote 36, I consider and reject another candidate that has been suggested to
me, namely, the power to propagate.
E II.xxvii.1. The idea of identity is formed ‘when comparing any thing as existing
at any determin’d time and place, we compare it with it self existing at another time’.
34
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lost, whereas a mass can endure no change in the particles that
constitute it. In other words, Locke thinks that masses and oaks
have different persistence conditions.
One might be worried that persistence conditions aren’t, in the
relevant sense, observable. It is clear that they must be observable
at least in the minimal sense that one could form an idea of those
conditions on the basis of one’s observations of the relevant
phenomena. After all, as we have seen, ‘we come to have the
Ideas of particular sorts of Substances, by collecting such
Combinations of simple Ideas, as are by Experience and
Observation of Men’s Senses taken notice of to exist together’ (E
II.xxiii.3). In other words, the simple ideas that are candidates for
inclusion in nominal essences, at least with respect to material
substances, are formed on the basis of one’s experiences and
observations. Now, although in the most frequently occurring
cases, Locke holds that the process of gaining and losing atoms
occurs ‘insensibly’, in a number of cases, like the case of a tree
growing, or a horse that is ‘sometimes fat, sometimes lean’, it is
clear that the mass that exists today is not the same as the one that
existed in the past (II.xxvii.3). And, as there are clear cases of a
gain and loss of particles, so too there also seem to be clear cases
of a plant’s continuing to live or ceasing to live. So it seems clear
we observe change and its absence in our observations of things
of this sort, at least in gross cases. And so it seems possible, by
observation, to come to these two ideas of persistence, the one
pertaining to masses and the other to oaks, even if we struggle to
judge in any particular case whether, in fact, some set of
persistence conditions is satisfied (e.g. whether the mass outside
my window is now the same mass). And for the purposes of
inclusion in a nominal essence, again, persistence conditions only
need to be observable in the sense that one could form an idea of
those conditions on the basis of one’s observations of the relevant
phenomena.
It seems that Locke himself recognized that the persistence
conditions of masses and oaks were good candidates for inclusion
in their respective nominal essences because he seems to have
included them. And it seems that it was this difference in
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persistence conditions that served as Locke’s basis for
distinguishing masses and the oaks they constitute. For he says,
‘wherein an Oak differs from a Mass of Matter… seems to me to
be in this: that the one is only the Cohesion of Particles of Matter
any how united, the other such a disposition of them as
constitutes the parts of an Oak; and such an organization of parts,
as is fit to receive and distribute nourishment so as to continue,
and frame the Wood, Bark, and Leaves, etc. of an Oak, in which
consists the vegetable Life’ (E II.xxvii.4). Locke goes on
immediately to lay out the persistence conditions of an oak tree,
in terms of a shared Life. So, in this passage, Locke seems to be
suggesting that an oak tree and the mass constituting it differ only
in that the mass remains the same mass so long as all the particles
of matter remain ‘any how united’ while the oak remains the oak
so long as its successive stages share in one common life. That is,
he seems to be drawing attention to the persistence conditions of
oak trees and masses to explain how an oak tree and a mass differ
in kind, even though at any given time the oak and the mass
constituting it will share all and only the same particles.
There also seems to be general support for the idea that the
persistence conditions of at least some things are contained in the
nominal essences of those things in the passage quoted above:
’Tis not therefore Unity of Substance that comprehends all sorts of Identity,
or will determine it in every Case: But to conceive and judge of it aright,
we must consider what Idea the Word it is applied to stands for: It being
one thing to be the same Substance, another the same Man, and a third the
same Person, if Person, Man, and Substance, are three Names standing for
three different Ideas; for such as is the Idea belonging to that Name, such
must be the Identity (E II.xxvii.7)

Here it seems that Locke is suggesting that to know whether
something is the same from one time to the next we have to
consult our idea of the thing(s) in question. His examples are all
general ideas: Person, Man, Substance. We have already seen
that, in Locke, every general idea is a nominal essence. So this
passage suggests that the persistence conditions of things that fall
under at least some terms are included in the nominal essences
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associated with those terms. If not, why would he think that
focusing on these ideas would help us get clear on the different
identity conditions? It seems he must think that facts about
persistence are built into those ideas. But this raises a possible
worry.35 If persistence conditions are built into at least some
nominal essences, don’t those nominal essences simply determine
the persistence conditions of the things that fall under those
kinds? After all, something must determine their persistence
conditions. Presumably it is essence that does so, and so it must
be either real essences or nominal essences. But it can’t be real
essences, since e.g. they’re unknowable. So it must be nominal
essences.
The claim that nominal essences determine the persistence
conditions of the things that fall under those kinds seems too
strong, at least in the case of material things. This is so for the
same basic reason that it seems too strong to say that the nominal
essence gold determines that the things that fall under that kind
dissolve in aqua regia. What is included in a nominal essence of
a material thing is constrained by the way the world is inasmuch
as a set of observable traits provides the raw material includable
in a nominal essence, even when it comes to persistence
conditions. That said, in the case of persistence conditions, the
relationship between what is observed and what is included in the
nominal essence is clearly less direct than in a case like aqua
regia and gold. An example may help to see how the world might
indirectly both provide and constrain the persistence conditions
associated with a particular nominal essence. And, indeed, it is
Locke himself, who provides the example of how this might go.
Locke sets about determining the appropriate persistence
conditions to ascribe to oaks, by first reflecting on what it is to be
an oak at a particular time—that is, by reflecting on the class of
shared features had at a time that we might associate with Oak.
As we have seen, he says, an oak is ‘such a disposition of
[particles of matter] as constitutes the parts of an Oak; and such
an Organization of those parts, as is fit to receive, and distribute
35

I owe this objection to an anonymous referee at Locke Studies.
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nourishment, so as to continue, and frame the Wood, Bark, and
Leaves, etc. of an Oak, in which consists the vegetable Life’
(II.xxvii.4). From these features associated with Oak, features
which are themselves constrained by the raw material of the
world, he settles on which of them provides the starting point for
determining the persistence conditions of oak trees.
He settles on life: ‘That being then one Plant, which has such
an Organization of Parts in one coherent Body, partaking of one
Common Life, it continues to be the same Plant, as long as it
partakes of the same Life, though that Life be communicated to
new Particles of Matter vitally united to the living Plant’
(II.xxvii.4). So, as Locke thinks of it, a nominal essence doesn’t
straightforwardly determine persistence conditions, independently
of any constraints. Rather, certain persistence conditions are
included in a nominal essence on the basis of the same basic sort
of process whereby less exotic features are included in nominal
essences—experience, observation, and reflection on salient traits
of things out there in the world. The process, however, is less
direct in the case of persistence conditions inasmuch as features
already included in the nominal essence seem to play an
important role in drawing attention to traits that are potentially
salient for a thing’s persistence.
In sum, then, at the very least it seems that including the
persistence conditions of oak trees and masses in nominal
essences was, in principle, available to Locke, in which case
Locke’s views need not be inconsistent. What is more, I have
given some reason to think that a stronger conclusion is
warranted: that Locke does indeed accept the notion that the
persistence conditions of oak trees and masses are included in
their respective nominal essences and so Locke himself includes a
feature in the nominal essences, mass and oak tree, that allows for
a difference of kind between the two. In either case, the
conclusion that Locke’s views on kinds cannot be made
consistent with his views on the oak-mass case can be avoided.36
36

In conversation, Martha Brandt Bolton has suggested there may be another, better
candidate feature that is recognizable only over time that might be included in the
nominal essence, oak tree, and not mass, namely, the power to propagate. Certainly, the
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§4. Conclusion
If the solution I have advocated for in this essay is correct, it
seems that the Kinds Problem cannot get off the ground. For, if I
am correct, a key premise that generates the problem is false. It
isn’t the case that, if at a time two things, x and y, have the same
internal constitution, x and y cannot differ in kind. For Locke
accepts that relational features only observable over time can be
included in nominal essences. Persistence conditions are this sort
of feature. And so there is nothing to keep us from saying that
Locke could—or perhaps did—maintain that the persistence
conditions of at least things like masses and oak trees are
included in the nominal essences, mass and oak tree. And, of
course, if the persistence conditions of two things, x and y, are
included in the nominal essences of x and y, then, if x and y have
different persistence conditions, then x and y can have the same
internal constitution at a time and still belong to different kinds—
power to propagate cannot be observed at a time. And the power to propagate is
something that very plausibly belongs to the kind, oak, and not the kind, mass.
However, I have a worry about this proposal: the power to propagate doesn’t seem
to be a feature that could, ultimately, explain a difference in kind at a time and that is
precisely what we need to do in order to avoid the Kinds Problem.
Take a mass, M, and an oak, O, that share an internal structure at a time. In order to
avoid the Kinds Problem, at a time, M must fall under a kind that O doesn’t, or vice
versa. In order for that to be possible, M or O must have a feature that the other lacks.
Now, whatever the power to propagate is, when had at a time, it apparently must be
generated by the internal structure of that which has it. But if that’s right, then M and O
either both have the power to propagate or they both lack it, since they share a
numerically identical internal structure. So, even if the power to propagate is included
in the kind, oak, both M and O will fall under that kind in the cases we’re interested in.
And so the power to propagate cannot explain a difference in kind at a time and, again,
that is precisely what we need to do in order to avoid the Kinds Problem.
Notice now that the same issue doesn’t arise if the relevant feature is the persistence
conditions. Take a mass, M2, and an oak, O2, that share an internal structure at a time:
say, t2. Assuming particles are added or lost between t 1 and t2, then M2 at t2 does not
bear the diachronic identity relation to M1 at t1. And assuming that a single Life is
shared across t1 and t2, then O2 at t2 does bear the diachronic identity relation to O1 at t1.
In other words, although at a time M2 and O2 share an internal structure, they do not
bear the same relations to their predecessors. As such, at t2 sense can be made of the
idea that the oak has a feature that the mass lacks: it bears a diachronic identity relation
to O1 that M2 does not bear. And so we can explain how O2 and M2 can be of different
kinds, despite sharing an internal structure at a time.
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where ‘kinds’ refers to nominal essences.
But one might have a general worry with this solution. It
seems that on the approach that I’m ascribing to Locke, facts
about persistence are thought to give rise to differences in ideas
that are then drawn upon to solve problems about persistence.
Isn’t there some sort of vicious circularity here? I think not. If the
Nominal Essence reading is correct, it seems that masses and
oaks are, out in pre-sorted nature, different in some important
sense.37 We recognize this important difference through
observation and so we come to have different general ideas that
capture how they differ out in the world. The important difference
we latch onto, Locke seems to suggest, is that what it takes for a
mass to be the same from one moment to the next is different
from what it is for an oak to be the same from one moment to the
next. That is, we grasp the difference between their respective
persistence conditions and so recognize that masses and oaks are
importantly different.
This important difference between the persistence conditions
of each is enough to solve a kind of problem related to the oakmass case, namely, how can the mass and oak be of different
kinds and so be in the same place at the same time? This
important difference in pre-sorted nature between masses and
oaks makes it possible to affirm that masses and oaks are of
different kinds, which allows us to affirm that at a time a mass,
M, and an oak constituted by it, O, are importantly different, and
so, in an important sense, distinct individuals.
So, according to this solution, it is not that we arbitrarily assign
different persistence conditions to masses and oaks and then that
assigned difference is appealed to in order to establish that masses
and oaks can be in the same place at the same time. Rather, the
37

Again, this is an important respect in which the Nominal Essence reading is
connected to a different background picture of the mass-oak case than, say, the
Material-Immaterial Substance reading. As it has been defended in the literature, the
Nominal Essence reading is deeply connected to the coincident object reading of the
mass-oak case—see Kaufman (2007). It should also be noted that, if the four
dimensionalist reading of the mass-oak case is correct, masses and oaks are, out in presorted nature, different in some important sense. It is only on the relative identity
reading of the mass-oak case that this claim will seem mistaken.
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fact that the persistence conditions of masses differ from those of
oaks in pre-sorted nature provides the basis both for recognizing
the persistence of masses and oaks and for picking oaks and
masses out as importantly different at a time. So there is no
vicious circularity here.
I have argued that Locke’s theory of kinds can be squared with
the Nominal Essence reading of his Place-Time-Kind Principle.
The general solution that I have advocated at least seems open to
Locke, given his treatment of nominal essences, his examples,
and his explanation of the mass-oak case in particular. And,
indeed, it seems that Locke himself may have adopted all the
essentials of this solution. It turns out, then, that the Kinds
Problem isn’t a problem for Locke, and so the Nominal Essence
reading should not be rejected on the grounds that it leaves
Locke’s views unnecessarily inconsistent. For he has given us the
means for a solution, one on which relational features observable
only over time play an important role in individuating objects.
This is an intriguing idea: individuation can be explained, at
least at times, by an appeal to temporally extended features of
individuals. It seems that this strategy may have interesting
applications in other cases. Of course, one of the applications
with which Locke seems most concerned is the case with which I
began the essay. And it seems that, even on the Nominal Essence
Reading, Locke has succeeded in putting us in a position to affirm
that the stately oak outside my window, even having lost all its
leaves and with them a host of particles, remains the same oak.38
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
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